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 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this study we provide empirical evidence demonstrating a relationship between the nature of the 
assets and the primary market spread. The model also provides predictions on how other pricing 
characteristics affect spread, since little is known about how and why spreads of asset-backed securities are 
influenced by loan tranche characteristics. We find that default and recovery risk characteristics represent 
the most important group in explaining loan spread variability. Within this group, the credit rating dummies 
are the most important variables to determine loan spread at issue. Nonetheless, credit rating is not a 
sufficient statistic for the determination of spreads. We find that the nature of the assets has a substantial 
impact on the spread across all samples, indicating that primary market spread with backing assets that 
cannot easily be replaced is significantly higher relative to issues with assets that can easily be obtained. Of 
the remaining characteristics, only marketability explains a significant portion of the spreads’ variability. In 
addition, variations of the specifications were estimated in order to asses the robustness of the conclusions 
concerning the determinants of loan spreads.  
 
 
Keywords: asset securitization, asset-backed securitisation, bank lending, default risk, risk management, 
leveraged financing. 
JEL classification: G21, G24, G32 
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 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This working paper presents the results of an empirical investigation into the pricing of asset 
securitization issues. Securitization is a technique developed to finance a collection of assets which by their 
very nature are non-tradable and therefore non-liquid. The central element of an asset securitization issue is 
the fact that repayment depends only or primarily on the assets and cash flows pledged as collateral to the 
issue, and not on the overall financial strengths of the originator (sponsor or parent company). In the 
context of this study, asset securitization is defined as the process in which assets are refinanced in the 
capital market by issuing securities sold to investors by a bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle 
(SPV). The primary objective of the SPV is to facilitate the securitization of the assets and to ensure that 
the SPV is established for bankruptcy purposes as a legal entity separate from the seller (Blum and 
DiAngelo 1997, p.244). Choudhry and Fabozzi (2004, p.5) mention that the capital market in which these 
securities are issued and traded consists of three main classes: asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-
backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). As a rule of thumb, securitization 
issues backed by mortgages are called MBS, and securitization issues backed by debt obligations are called 
CDO1 (see Nomura, 2004, and Fitch Ratings, 2004).  Securitization issues backed by consumer-backed 
products - car loans, consumer loans and credit cards, among others - are called ABS (see Moody’s 
Investors Service, 2002). 
Securitization was first introduced on U.S. mortgage markets in the 1970s. The market for 
mortgage-backed securities was boosted by the government agencies that endorsed these securities. In 
1985, securitization techniques that had been developed in the mortgage market were initially applied to a 
class of non-mortgage assets - car loans. After the success of this initial transaction, securitization issues 
                                                 
1  Ultimately, all debt obligations in a CDO portfolio can be classified as bonds or loans, although both types of debt come in 
various forms with their own unique characteristics. Generally speaking, bonds are fixed income, tradable, and relatively liquid debt 
obligations issued by an entity seeking external capital in debt markets, be it a sovereign, corporate or financial institution. Loans are 
less fungible instruments in comparison with bonds since they are generally less liquid, and therefore less tradable, and will usually be 
held by a smaller group of investors (lenders) than is the case with bonds (see Fitch Ratings, 2004). 
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 were backed by an increasingly diverse and ever-expanding array of assets, including corporate assets such 
as lease receivables and bank assets such as payments associated with corporate loans. Since then, the 
securitization market has grown to become one of the most prominent fixed income sectors in the U.S. and 
in fact one of the fastest evolving sectors around the world. Securitization can be found both in developed 
and in emerging countries (Standard & Poor’s, 2006). 
 Given its increasing importance as a funding vehicle and risk management tool, it is not surprising 
that asset securitization has attracted considerable academic interest. According to Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), in perfect capital markets, a firm’s financing decisions are irrelevant because they do not create 
firm value. Thus, in line with their propositions, it is irrelevant whether a firm adopts asset securitization or 
not. However, in modern economic views, there are sufficient theoretical rationalizations for a firm or 
organization to securitize their assets: in the light of signaling (Myers and Majluf, 1984), (Greenbaum and 
Thakor, 1987), (Riddiough, 1997), (Minton, Opler and Stanton, 1997), (Plantin, 2004); in the light of 
avoiding underinvestment (Benveniste and Berger, 1987), (James, 1988), (Stanton, 1995), (Sopranzetti, 
1999); in the light of avoiding asset substitution  (Lockwood, Rutherford and Herrera, 1996), (Thomas, 
1999, 2001), and finally in the light of avoiding the costs of standard bankruptcy (Skarabot, 2001), (Gorton 
and Souleles, 2005), (Ayotte and Gaon, 2005). Ergo, even though asset securitization is costly and would 
not be undertaken in frictionless and complete markets, recent financial theory suggests that firms may 
benefit from asset securitization.  
Several other streams of theoretical research address other asset securitization characteristics in 
addition to demonstrating that firms may benefit from securitization in the light of certain market 
imperfections. Although the vast majority of articles and working papers are based on theoretical rather 
than empirical studies, numerous recent theoretical breakthroughs in the analysis of securitization and its 
use have all yielded important insights into the observed structure and pricing features of asset 
securitization issues. Key articles include theoretical studies carried out by Duffie and Gârleanu (2001), 
Jobst (2002, 2003), and Choudhry and Fabozzi (2003) on originating collateralized debt obligations; 
theoretical studies on special purpose vehicles and the impact on bankruptcy remoteness, carried out by 
Gorton and Souleless (2005) and Ayotte and Gaon (2005); an empirical study explaining launch spreads on 
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 structured bonds, performed by Firla-Cuchra (2005); descriptive studies of asset-backed securitization and 
its use, carried out by Schwarcz (1994) and Roever and Fabozzi (2003); a theoretical model proposed by 
Plantin (2004) in which tranching presents itself as the optimal structure; an empirical study carried out by 
Ammer and Clinton (2004) investigating the impact of credit rating changes on the pricing of asset-backed 
securities; theoretical studies on originating mortgage-backed securities performed by Childs, Ott and 
Riddiough (1996) and Oldfield (2000); an empirical study by Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson (2006) 
investigating the determinants of tranching; descriptive studies by Jobst (2005a) on the regulatory treatment 
of asset securitization; a descriptive study on collateralized fund obligations performed by Stone and Zissu 
(2004), and finally a theoretical study by Cummins (2004) on the securitization of life insurance assets and 
liabilities. 
To summarize this section, we believe that the above-mentioned studies provide us with a clear 
understanding of the motivations, structural considerations and pricing features of asset securitization. 
Generally speaking, the asset securitization market is composed of asset-backed securities (ABS), 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). The securitization market 
has grown to become one of the most prominent fixed income sectors, and the securitization issues are 
backed by a diverse and ever-expanding array of assets.  
However, despite the markets’ size and their recent growth, the question precisely how financial 
market participants price these securities has been somewhat neglected in the academic literature.2  To 
address this issue, the question constituting the focus of this working paper investigates which determinants 
influence the primary market spreads of asset-backed securitization issues. The analysis of the 
determinants concerning primary market spreads of asset-backed securitization issues provides a major and 
highly useful addition to our understanding of the pricing factors which indeed characterize fixed income 
markets.  
                                                 
2  Firla-Cuchra (2005) has investigated the determinants of launch spreads in European securitization transactions using a 
sample of 5,161 observations. The dataset includes all structured finance transactions, but limited to the European market. The author 
documents the importance of the impact of credit ratings and other price determinants on the launch spread. However, the study 
contains a methodological drawback in that neither security classes have been defined nor correlation tests have been conducted, 
which casts doubt on the significance of the findings. 
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 The purpose of this working paper is twofold. First, we investigate the impact on the primary 
market spread of an asset-backed security caused by the nature of the assets after controlling for other 
pricing characteristics.3 Second, this research analyzes these other pricing characteristics exclusively for 
the asset-backed security. The choice of asset-backed securities (ABS) as target security class in the 
empirical analyses is based on two main considerations. First,  ABS are issued by both financial institut
and corporations; MBS and CDO are issued mainly by financial institutions. Second, ABS include a mu
wider variety of assets in comparison with MBS and CDO.  
ions 
ch 
                                                
Five arguments illustrate this study’s contribution to the field of interest. First, there is no standard 
data source for these securities, and therefore few empirical studies exist of how these securities are priced. 
A major contribution of our study lies in the assembly and analysis of a substantial dataset describing the 
characteristics of asset securitization issues. Second, the vast majority of published articles and working 
papers related to asset securitization are theoretical rather than empirical.  To the best of our knowledge, 
our study is the first to have conducted a full-scale empirical analysis of how these securities are priced.   
As a third contribution, we provide the reader with several explicit estimates of spread 
components that have not been considered by previous empirical studies. These factors are related to three 
main aspects: (i) default, investigated by variables such as loan to value, the type of originator and the type 
of collateral; (ii) marketability, analyzed by the type of primary market; and (iii) systemic risk, investigated 
by the country of origin, and finally legal risk.  
The fourth contribution lies in the fact that the determinants of primary market spreads are relevant 
for different classes of capital market participants. Investment banks in charge of structuring the technical 
features of certain issues may find the estimates concerning the size of each variable’s impact on the 
issuance spread by security class a useful tool. Second, financial institutions and corporations wishing to 
raise funds in the asset-backed markets may obtain reasonable estimates of the average spread that they 
would face. Third, rating agencies are provided with empirical information concerning the way their credit 
risk evaluations are perceived by investors.  
 
3  It is important to note that this study is based on issuance spreads. Secondary market spreads are not preferred because it is 
loan spreads at issuance that reflect actual loan prices,  rather than estimations derived from pricing matrices or dealers’ quotes. 
Issuance spreads are a more accurate measure not only of the actual cost of debt but also of the risk premium demanded by investors.  
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 Finally, as a fifth contribution, this study not only complements the academic literature on the 
pricing of asset securitization issues, but also adds to the vast empirical and theoretical literature that seeks 
to explain the bond spread over Treasury yields (see Duffee (1999), Duffie, Pedersen, and Singleton 
(2000), and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), among others). In addition, we believe that this 
study’s empirical results also contribute to the growing body of theoretical and empirical literature on the 
role of collateralization other than securitization (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Besanko and Thakor 
(1987), Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991), John, Lynch and Puri (2003), and finally Gonas, Highfield and 
Mullineaux (2004), among others). 
In the following sections, we shall discuss the results of our analyses. The remainder of this 
working paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the background information and hypothesis are 
discussed. In Section 3 we discuss our data. Section 4 describes our regression model. In Section 5 we turn 
to our regression analysis and explore each explanatory variable affecting loan spread in our sample. In 
Section 6 we asses the robustness of the conclusions concerning the determinants of ABS loan spreads. 
Finally, Section 7 concludes this working paper. 
 
 
2.  Background Information and Hypothesis 
Ayotte and Gaon (2005) have developed a theoretical model which incorporates the differential 
control rights and cash flow rights that various lenders receive at bankruptcy. They argue that asset 
securitization is unique in that it maximizes ex-post protection of creditors in bankruptcy. Inefficient 
continuation of the sponsor in a situation of default is hereby reduced. However, the reduction of inefficient 
continuation depends heavily on the nature of assets being securitized. On the basis of this argument, the 
authors expect asset securitization to be the most efficient instrument when the backing assets are 
replaceable only. In a sponsor default, replaceable assets can easily be obtained from outside sources at a 
competitive price. So, the sponsor may then have no incentive to file a claim against the SPV to obtain the 
assets securitized, and thus the claim of the SPV is not diluted.  
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 However, when the securitized assets are necessary for operations and the firm cannot easily 
replace them by resorting to outside markets, securitization may lead to inefficient hold-ups. This result is 
consistent with the theoretical characterization of asset securitization, in that avoiding dilution of the 
investor’s claim in a standard bankruptcy of the sponsor is valuable in a way that is observable in prices. 
Thus, we would expect a higher spread for securities backed by assets that cannot easily be replaced. 
Unfortunately, the sign of the coefficient cannot be determined clearly for all assets that serve as collateral 
for an asset securitization issue, since the assets exhibit a wide variety of pay-off characteristics.  
Nonetheless, in particular, we expect a positive coefficient for whole business loans and future 
receivables on the one hand, and a negative coefficient for automobile loans and credit card receivables on 
the other. Two reasons can be given. First, whole business and future receivables are secured by a pledge 
on a unique set of assets and therefore considered difficult to replace. Second, automobile loans and credit 
card receivables are relatively homogeneous and relatively easy to replace in a constructed portfolio.  
These findings give rise to the following question: do securitized assets that cannot easily be 
replaced have a significant positive impact on the primary market spread of an asset securitization issue 
relative to issues with assets that can easily be obtained?  Since we wish to control for other pricing 
characteristics, such as credit rating for example, statistical significance could be poor as the risk inherent 
to an asset type is already reflected in the rating of a securitization issue.  We therefore propose the 
following hypothesis: the primary market spread for securitization issues with backing assets that cannot 
easily be replaced is not significantly higher relative to issues with assets that can easily be obtained. 
In order to test this hypothesis we used an ordinary least squares regression analysis to model the 
magnitude of the difference between securitization issues with backing assets that can easily be replaced 
and with assets that cannot easily be replaced. We restricted our analysis to our sample of ABS issues for 
the reasons mentioned in Section 1.  
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 3.  Data Description 
The principal data source used in this study is formed by the data provided in Structured Finance 
International Magazine, published by Euromoney Institutional Investor Plc. Structured Finance 
International (hereafter: SFI) is recognized as one of the leading journals and news sources by the foremost 
market practitioners - issuers, investors, bankers and other service providers. In particular, SFI provides 
data on the volume and nature of securitization activities, as well as accurate and transparent league tables 
on the global capital markets spanning Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa and the Americas. This 
database contains detailed historical information on virtually the entire population of securitization of non-
U.S. assets from January 1, 1999 through March 31, 2005. We freeze the sample as of this date for the 
current analysis. We will update the sample throughout the review process. Our sample contains 
information on 2,427 ABS issues (worth €363.19 billion) and we refer to this as our “full sample”. Because 
the unit of observation is a single issue (single loan tranche), multiple issues (multiple loan tranches) from 
the same transaction appear as separate observations in our database - 765 transactions, containing 2,427 
issues. Although comprehensive in many ways, our full sample has three limitations for our purposes. 
First, it provides detailed information on securitization transactions limited to non-U.S. assets and dated 
after 1998. Second, we do not have information measuring  credit risk information of the originator, such as 
solvency, liquidity or leverage ratios. Third, some of the issues may lack key variables such as credit 
spread.  
One of the most important objectives of this study is to analyze the impact on the primary market 
spread of an asset-backed security caused by the nature of the assets after controlling for other pricing 
characteristics. In addition, we provide empirical evidence concerning these other pricing characteristics 
that may affect the primary market spread of ABS issues. A comparison of empirical studies shows that 
each study employs a different set of explanatory variables in accordance with its research objective. Some 
variables associated with the loan are used in all regressions, whereas variables describing additional 
characteristics differ significantly (e.g. Kleimeier Megginson (1998), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann 
(2001), Kleimeier and Megginson (2001), John, Lynch and Puri (2003), Firla-Cuchra (2005), Gabbi and 
Sironi (2005)). To address this issue, our full sample is categorized with respect to three main groups of 
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 explanatory variables: A.) default and recovery risk characteristics; B.) marketability characteristics; C.) 
systemic risk characteristic. We divided each group into a set of variables that are meaningful for the 
pricing of asset securitization issues. For each group, a set of variables was chosen derived from existing 
theoretical and empirical evidence.  
We selected from our full sample those issues associated with ABS for which data on spreads 
were available or computable. We also screen for complete data on default and recovery risk 
characteristics, marketability characteristics and systemic risk characteristics.  This procedure has yielded a 
sub-sample of 968 ABS issues (worth €178.51 billion). We refer to this as our “high-information sample”, 
while we call the larger dataset our “full sample”. Our sample includes issues with six A.) default and 
recovery risk characteristics (credit rating, loan to value, type of originator, maturity, credit enhancement, 
and nature of assets); ten B.) marketability characteristics (time of issue, loan size, transaction size, number 
of tranches,  type of market, number of lead managers, number of credit rating agencies, whether the issue 
is a tap issue or not, whether the issue is retained or not, and finally type of interest rate), and four C.) 
systemic risk characteristic  (country of origin, creditor rights, enforcement, and currency risk).  
Table 1 compares the pricing characteristics in the full sample of issues associated with ABS with 
the pricing characteristics associated with the newly created sub-sample of ABS.  
****Insert Table 1 about here**** 
 
We documented an average survival rate of 42.7% from the full sample to the sub-sample of ABS 
issues. Dissimilarity occurs between the two samples with respect to the type of primary market (84.0% 
euromarket recorded in the sub-sample versus 51.1% in the full sample). We shall run an additional 
regression for issues placed in euromarket and other markets. With this check, we aim to investigate 
whether the relationship between spread and pricing characteristics is different across euromarkets and 
other markets. Also, the sub-sample is very similar to our full sample in terms of spread, A.) default and 
recovery risk (credit rating, loan to value, type of originator, maturity, credit enhancement, nature of 
assets), B.) marketability (time, size of the tranche, size of transaction, number of tranches, number of lead 
managers, number of credit rating agencies, tap issue, retained issue, type of interest rate) and finally C.) 
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 systemic characteristics (country of origin, creditor rights, enforcement, currency risk).4 So, we shall 
assume that any empirical results derived from the ABS sub-sample may be generalized to the larger 
population of ABS issues. 
 
 
4.  Regression Model 
In this section, we subject the high-information sample detailed in Table 1, to ordinary least 
squares regression analysis. 5  Our purpose in doing this are two-fold. First we wish to determine the 
impact on the primary market spread of an asset-backed security caused by the nature of the asset
controlling for other pricing characteristics. Second, we wish to provide empirical evidence concerning 
these other pricing characteristics that may affect the primary market spread of ABS issues. In order to 
allow for a comparison of the empirical results, the proxies we used to test which factors affect primary 
market spread are based on theory. We shall provide a brief explanation for each variable below. In line 
with previous research in this area, we estimate the determinants of the primary market spread with the help 
of the following model: 
s after 
                                                
 
SPREADi =  αn + ß1 CREDIT RATINGi + ß2 LOAN TO VALUEi + ß3 TYPE ORIGINATORi 
+ ß4 MATURITYi + ß5 ENHANCEMENTi + ß6 NATURE OF ASSETS + ß7 
TIME OF ISSUE + ß8 LOAN SIZEi + ß9 TRANSACTION SIZEi + ß10 # 
TRANCHESi + ß11 TYPE MARKET + ß12  # LEAD MANAGERSi + ß13 # 
RATING AGENCIESi + ß14 TAPi  + ß15 RETAINEDi + ß16 TYPE INTERESTi +  
ß17 COUNTRY ORIGINi + ß18 CREDITOR RIGHTSi + ß19 ENFORCEMENTi  + 
ß20 CURRENCY RISKi + εi            (1) 
   
 
4   For  transaction size and number of tranches, we calculated average and standard deviation, taking into account transaction 
size and number of tranches for each transaction individually. 
 
5  Our model adjusts for heteroscedasticity through White’s methodology (1980). 
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 A discussion of these variables (and expected impact on primary market spread) will follow 
below.  
 
4.1 Primary Market Spread 
The SPREAD (primary market spread) represents the price for the risk associated with the security 
on the basis of information at the time of issue. In our sample, the spread is defined as the margin yielded 
by the security at issue above a corresponding benchmark. The benchmark is presented in basis points. For 
floating rate issues, the spread (in basis points) is reported as a quoted margin above the Interbank Offered 
Rate. For fixed rate issues, the spread is represented in basis points over the closest benchmark of matching 
maturity.  
 
4.2 Expected Default and Recovery Risk Characteristics 
The first set of explanatory variables affecting loan spread consists of default and recovery risk 
(group A.). The following factors used here represent default and recovery risk characteristics: credit rating, 
loan to value, type of originator, maturity, credit enhancement, nature of assets. A discussion of these 
variables and expected impact on primary market spread will follow below.  
The credit rating of a loan issue is an evaluation of the likelihood of a borrower defaulting on a 
loan. By including CREDIT RATING in our analysis, we can analyze the impact of default on a 
securitization issue. A better bond rating should result in lower spreads. This notion is empirically 
supported by Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001), John, Lynch and Puri (2003), and finally Gabbi 
and Sironi (2005), who all find credit rating statistically significant. CREDIT RATING should capture the 
difference in both issuers’ creditworthiness and bonds’ seniority and security structures. Needing a 
consistent rating classification, we used the ratings scales as shown in Table 2. This classification scheme 
consists of 21 rating scales for three rating agencies: Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s.  
****Insert Table 2 about here**** 
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 As part of the process, we collected the credit rating class at the time of issuance. If a loan tranche 
had multiple ratings, we calculated the average of the given values, rounded off to the nearest absolute 
value, as the rating classification. We used a set of seven CREDIT RATING dummy variables that 
correspond to credit rating: 1-2 (CR=1-2), 3-4 (CR=3-4), 5-6 (CR=5-6), 7-8 (CR=7-8), 9-10 (CR=9-10), 
11-12 (CR=11-12), and 13-14 (CR=13-14).  Credit rating classifications above B1/B+ (CR>14) are not 
available. Credit rating 1-2 (CR=1-2) is the omitted rating category: it has been dropped to avoid 
collinearity. A word of caution is needed here, as it is important to remember that the rating scales are 
inverse scales, so that spread increases as rating decreases.  
Given our desire to control for credit protection of all positions subordinate to a loan tranche, we 
included the LOAN TO VALUE (cumulative level of subordination) in our analysis. In an asset 
securitization transaction, the senior-subordinated structure splits cash flows into many classes of notes, 
with each class, or loan tranche, having absolute priority in the cash flow over the more junior classes. This 
structure is layered, so that each position benefits from the credit protection of all the positions 
subordinated to it. Typical subordination levels are expressed as a percentage of the transaction’s initial 
principal balance.  
We shall illustrate this with the following example. Using a capital structure of two tranches - 
Class B Junior of €40 million and Class A Senior of €60 million - the originator might sell only the Class A 
tranche. The investor would bear the risk that losses on the underlying portfolio exceed the cumulative 
subordination level of 40% (€40 million divided by a total of €100 million). If losses reached 40%, the 
Class B Junior tranche would be wiped out. Between 40% and 100%, each Euro loss on the underlying 
portfolio translates into an equal Euro loss for the holder of the Class A Senior tranche. 
To compute the subordination levels, we manually calculated the subordination level for each loan 
tranche in each transaction that contains more than one tranche. If a transaction contains one tranche only, 
the cumulative subordination level is 100% and no subordination exists.6 Also, the size of all tranches in a 
transaction had to be available; otherwise the subordination level could not be calculated. We finally 
                                                 
6  If the securitization is structured as a “pass-through,” there is only one class of bonds, and all investors participate 
proportionally in the net cash flows from the assets. 
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 calculated the loan-to-value ratio as the value of a loan cumulated according to the priority structure 
divided by the total issue amount of the transaction. The expected coefficient sign is negative, as loans with 
a lower loan-to-value ratio (junior tranches) have a lower expected recovery rate in case of default than 
loans with a higher loan-to-value ratio (senior tranches) and therefore require a higher return.  
The originator is the seller of the assets which comprise the collateral for the securities. We 
included TYPE ORIGINATOR to analyze the impact of the originator on the spread. Gabi and Sironi 
(2002) mention that financial institutions should control for the presence of implicit government guarantees 
not already incorporated into the rating of an issue. Regrettably, the authors provide no definition of the 
term ‘financial institution’.7 The authors find a negative, both significant and insignificant, relationship 
between financial institution and loan spread.  They argue that the lower perceived default risk presented by 
banks versus the risk presented by non-financial firms is reflected in a lower spread. In a similar context, 
Gorton and Souleles (2005) argue that the strength of the sponsor matters in pricing the debt of the SPV. 
This is consistent with investors in the asset securitization markets pricing the risk that sponsors disappear 
and can no longer support their SPVs. 
Information on the originator will help us classify the asset securitization issues by type of 
originator. The listed originator may be the parent company of one or more subsidiary companies which 
actually originated the collateral or sold it to the securitization vehicle. Unfortunately, our database does 
not provide a machine-readable identification code (i.e. Datastream identification number) for the 
originator, although descriptive information is provided by SFI to match the description of the originator to 
its corresponding classification. Needing a consistent classification, we started with the seven types of 
originators involved in a securitization transaction as distinguished by Moody’s Investor Service (2002). 
These types include corporate, bank, finance house, sovereign, public entity, savings bank and insurance 
company. Unfortunately, SFI does not provide full information to distinguish between bank and savings 
bank in our sample. For this reason, we integrated both and classified them as one category named ‘bank’.  
                                                 
7  Banks are financial institutions that accept deposits and make loans. However, other financial institutions also exist, such as 
insurance companies, finance companies, pension funds, mutual funds and investment banks (Eakins and Mishkin, 2000, p. 9). 
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 We constructed a set of six originator dummy variables that correspond to: CORPORATE, BANK, 
FINANCE HOUSE, SOVEREIGN, PUBLIC and INSURANCE.  After we screened the originator 
description of all our asset securitization issues in our database, we assigned each tranche to one of six 
types of originators. This screening process left us with 2,289 issues (94.3% of entire sample) that we could 
identify. This is illustrated in Table 3.  
****Insert Table 3 about here**** 
 
The category CORPORATE includes those credits originated by corporations and represents 
20.2% of the identified sample (491 issues). BANK include those issues originated by financial institutions 
that accept deposits and use their funds principally to purchase financial assets such as loans and securities. 
This category includes 1,083 issues (44.6% of the identified sample). FINANCE HOUSE include issues of 
firms that granted loans to both individuals and corporations, and correspond to 541 issues (22.3% of the 
identified sample). Some of the loans are similar to bank loans, such as consumer and automobile loans, but 
others are more specialized. Finance houses differ from banks in that they do not accept deposits and 
typically are finance subsidiaries of automobile manufacturers or of retailer groups. SOVEREIGN include 
those issues booked by national governments and are represented by 35 issues (1.4% of the identified 
sample). PUBLIC are those issues originated by any state or local government and count for 120 issues 
(4.9% of the identified sample).8 The category INSURANCE includes those issues made by financial 
institutions that primarily sell insurance. In this category, 19 issues were booked, representing 0.8% of the 
sample. The 138 issues (5.7% of the total sample) not identified are recorded in the category not identified. 
We expect to find a negative and significant coefficient for financial institutions (BANK, 
FINANCE HOUSE, INSURANCE) for two reasons: first, financial institutions should control for the 
presence of implicit government guarantees that are not already incorporated into the rating of an issue and 
second, the strength of the sponsor matters in pricing the debt of the SPV. CORPORATE is the omitted 
category; it has been dropped to avoid collinearity. 
                                                 
8  In our sample, we have included all asset securitization issues by utilities in the category ‘public entity’. 
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 MATURITY is measured in years and affects the bond’s default risk premium (Merton [1974]).9 
We calculated the time to maturity as the difference between the legal maturity date of the issue and the 
launch date.10 Three maturity dummy variables were constructed based on the maturity of the issue: 
‘lowmaturity’, ‘medmaturity’ and ‘highmaturity’. Lowmaturity is 1 if the issue matures in less than 5 years, 
medmaturity is 1 if the issue matures between 5 and 15 years, highmaturity is 1 if the loan matures after 15 
years. The variables’ expected signs cannot be determined clearly from either the theoretical or the 
empirical literature.11    
In our sample, issues with ENHANCEMENT refer to issues with a third-party guarantee in the 
form of an insurance policy issued by one of the monoline insurance companies. Dummy variables take the 
value of 1 if a loan is guaranteed and zero otherwise. These providers guarantee (or wrap) the principal and 
interest payments of an issue. For each issue, we collected information whether or not the issue is 
guaranteed. According to Fabozzi and Roever (2003), for each class of securities in a given structure, the 
issuer evaluates the trade-off associated with the cost of enhancement versus the reduction in yield required 
to sell the security. Thus, a negative coefficient is expected. However, its statistical significance could be 
poor as credit enhancement is already reflected in the rating of the issue.  
We included NATURE OF ASSETS to analyze the impact of collateral on the spread. Ayotte and 
Gaon (2005) argue that the nature of assets is valuable to creditors. The authors provide evidence that asset 
securitization is the most efficient instrument when the securitized assets are replaceable.  In the case of 
default of the sponsor, replaceable assets can easily be obtained from outside sources at a competitive price. 
However, when the assets are necessary for operations and the firm cannot easily replace them by resorting 
to outside markets, securitization may lead to inefficient hold-ups. Thus, we would expect a higher spread 
                                                 
9  One should not confuse time to maturity of the issue with weighted average life since weighted average life deals in 
particular with the sensitivity of the value of the loan towards changes in interest rates. Unfortunately, since weighted average life is 
based on assumptions specified at issuance concerning prepayments defaults and other relevant variables, this variable was 
unavailable in our sample.   
 
10  Legal maturity is defined as the date before which a specific tranche of securities must be repaid in order not be in default. 
 
11  Helwege and Turner (1998) argue that a positive coefficient is expected as longer maturity bonds require, ceteris paribus, a 
higher spread. On the other hand, Sarig and Warga (1989) find a negative relationship between maturity and loan spread. 
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 for securities backed by assets that cannot be easily replaced relative to ones with assets that can easily be 
obtained. 
Within the ABS classification, there is considerable variation in the nature of the collateral 
pledged. This is illustrated in Table 3. We shall briefly discuss the nature of the assets attached as collateral 
to a particular type of security. According to Moody’s Investors Service (2002, 2005), ten asset types for 
asset-backed securities are identified: automobile loans, consumer loans, future receivables, equipment 
leases, credit card receivables, trade receivables, small business loans, aircraft leases, whole business, and 
other.12 After identification of the asset types, we screened our full sample and assigned each loan tranche 
to its corresponding asset classification. We cross checked our data with the corresponding information 
provided by the credit rating agencies. We were able to identify the nature of the assets for 100% within 
our entire sample. We constructed a set of nine collateral dummy variables that correspond to: AUTO, 
CONSUMER, FUTURE, CREDIT CARD, SMALL BUSINESS, AIRCRAFT, EQUIPMENT, WHOLE 
BUSINESS and OTHER. 
 AUTO (automobile loans) are loans granted to borrowers in order to finance the purchase of new 
or used automobiles, and are typically secured by liens on the automobiles being financed. CONSUMER 
(consumer loans) are unsecured loans granted to individuals and used for different purposes (car, home, 
equipment, furniture, etc.). FUTURE (future receivables) refer to securitization of receivables that do not 
exist. Created as a function of future sales, they are used to finance the time lag between the start of an 
obligation and payment or redemption of the related debt. CREDIT CARD (credit card receivables) are 
loans granted to consumers in order to finance the purchase of goods and services, and are generally 
unsecured. SMALL BUSINESS (small business loans) are loans made available for small businesses 
seeking to make capital investments, and may be secured. AIRCRAFT (aircraft leases) and EQUIPMENT 
(equipment leases) are both agreements between an owner (lessor) and a user (lessee), whereby the lessee 
makes a periodic payment to the lessor for the use of the product. Equipment leases are considered to be 
small or medium-sized, while aircraft leasing falls under the big-sized leases. WHOLE BUSINESS (whole 
                                                 
12  In our sample, the category trade receivables is grouped under ‘other’ since few observations were classified as trade 
receivables.  Trade receivables are unsecured obligations generated when one business sells goods or services to another. 
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 business loans) are granted to a business, and the originator intends to repay the loan out of the cash flows 
generated by its business. OTHER (other loans) are issues secured by assets that do not fall into any of the 
categories described above. 
Unfortunately, the sign of the coefficient cannot be determined clearly for all assets that serve as 
collateral for an asset securitization issue, since the assets exhibit a wide variety of payoff characteristics. 
Nonetheless, in particular, we expect a positive coefficient for WHOLE BUSINESS and FUTURE on the 
one hand, and a negative coefficient for AUTO and CREDIT CARD on the other. Two reasons can be 
given. First, whole business loans and future receivables are secured by a pledge on a unique set of assets 
and therefore considered difficult to replace. Second, automobile loans and credit card receivables are 
relatively homogeneous and relatively easy to replace in a constructed portfolio. Still, its statistical 
significance could be poor as the risk inherent to an asset type is already reflected in the rating of a 
securitization issue. AUTO is the omitted category: it has been dropped to avoid collinearity. 
 
4.3 Expected Marketability Characteristics 
 The second set of explanatory variables affecting loan spread is marketability of the loan (group 
B.). The following factors used here represent marketability: time of issue, loan size, transaction size, 
number of tranches,  type of market, number of lead managers, number of credit rating agencies, whether 
the issue is a tap issue or not, whether the issue is retained or not, and finally type of interest rate. A 
discussion of these variables and expected impact on primary market will follow below.  
TIME OF ISSUE refers to the year in which an asset securitization issue is launched. We collected 
information from January 1, 1999 through March 31, 2005. PERIOD I: value is 1 if loan was issued in the 
1999-2001 period, zero if not. PERIOD II: value is 1 if loan was issued in the 2002-2005 period, zero if 
not. The first transaction recorded in our sample is the securitization of Japanese consumer loans of Credia 
Capital Ltd on January 19, 1999. The last transaction recorded is a portfolio of United Kingdom residential 
mortgages by HBOs on March 16, 2005. Although these data are updated monthly, we freezed the sample 
as of March 2005 for the current analysis. The time of the issue should capture the variations in bond 
market conditions. The sign of the coefficient cannot be predicted with confidence. 
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 The LOAN SIZE is the natural log of the face value of the loan tranche.13 A higher issue amount 
is generally believed to improve, ceteris paribus, secondary market liquidity. Larger issues are likely to be 
associated with less uncertainty, to be more liquid, and to have more public information available about 
them than smaller offerings. Hence, we would expect larger issues to have lower spreads. Thus, we would 
also expect to find a negative impact of TRANSACTION SIZE (the natural log of the transaction issue 
Euro equivalent amount) on the spread.14  
Each transaction is divided into one or more tranches. For every issue in a given transaction, we 
documented the number of tranches for each transaction. We included # TRANCHES to analyze the impact 
of tranching on the spread. Tranching could allow the issuer to take advantage of market factors such as 
greater investor sophistication and heterogeneous screening skills related to asymmetric information. Thus, 
a negative coefficient of number of tranches is expected.15 
The # LEAD MANAGERS represents the number of financial institutions participating in the loan 
issuance management group. These include the lead manager, any co-lead manager, book runners and co-
managers. We collected this information in order to analyze any differences in syndicate.  A negative 
coefficient sign is expected, as this would indicate that a larger syndicate is able to achieve, ceteris paribus, 
a better result or lower loan spread.  
The # RATING AGENCIES represents the number of rating agencies involved in rating the issue. 
Since many larger credit rating agencies offer credit rating advisory services, this could create a potential 
conflict of interest, as the credit rating agency may feel obligated to provide the issuer with that given 
rating if the issuer follows its advice on structuring the offering  (The Bond Market Association [2002]). 
Many institutional investors now prefer a debt issuance to have at least three ratings. Thus, a negative 
coefficient sign is expected, as this would indicate that a larger number of credit rating agencies involved in 
                                                 
13  The currency of the issue has to be analyzed carefully since the value of a securitization issue is often stated in foreign 
currency. In order to include the issues denominated in different currencies in the analysis, we converted them into Euros. The 
exchange rate used is the average rate of the year the issue was launched. This information was obtained from the Nederlandsche 
Bank.  
 
14  Transaction size is the face value sum of all  tranches for a given transaction. 
 
15  Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson (2006) found a consistent and significant negative relationship between the number of tranches 
and the launch spread after controlling for credit rating. 
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 rating the issue is able to achieve, ceteris paribus, a more accurate rating, thereby reducing the potential 
conflict of interest and lowering the loan spread.  
TAP is a debt security issued in varying amounts and at different times, usually in response to 
investor demand. For each loan tranche, we collected information on whether the issue was a tap issuance 
or not. A dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue is a tap issue, zero otherwise. The term of the bond 
(issuing conditions, coupon and maturity) remain unchanged in general, but the tap price may vary 
according to market conditions. For example, Nomura issued the Unique Pub Finance Plc securitization in 
March 1999 for £810 million, with a tap issuance of £335 million in February 2001. With the tap, 677 pubs 
were added to the original 2,614 pubs. Some of these are piecemeal acquisitions, but many are houses that 
could not be securitized earlier. A second tap was made in September 2002, incorporating 888 new pubs 
into the transaction.16 Since tap issues are repeat issues and will allow the total loan to grow in size and 
secondary market activity, we would expect to find a negative relationship between the tap issue and the 
spread. However, its statistical significance could be poor as the characteristics associated with a repeat 
issue are already reflected in the rating.  
In our sample, the placement of the securities has to be analyzed carefully since issues are either 
sold to investors in the market or retained by the originator as a subordinated interest. For each loan 
tranche, we collected information on whether the originator retains a subordinated interest or sold it to 
investors, and in what type of market.  
The bulk of the demand for our entire sample of issues comes from the euromarket, the remaining 
part is placed on other markets. Since the euromarket forms the largest market relative to other markets, in 
our analysis, we have included two dummy variables: one for the EUROMARKET and one for 
OTHERMARKETS. Although stronger primary markets (well-organized) are considered more transparent 
and more organized in comparison with weaker primary markets, no relationship between the type of the 
market and the spread at issue can be predicted with confidence. 
                                                 
16  To protect the pool against dilution, structured financings typically provide for issuance caps, under which additional 
securities are either not permitted or are permitted only upon confirmation by the rating agencies that the ratings of existing securities 
will not be jeopardized by the new issuance. 
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 We included TYPE INTEREST to analyze the impact of fixed and floating interest rates on the 
spread. We collected information on whether the issue had a rate fixed for the life of the issue, or had an 
interest rate that fluctuated depending on the base interest rate (floating rate issue). We constructed two 
dummy variables based on the type of interest rate. FIXED is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a 
loan is fixed–price, and zero otherwise. FLOATING is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a loan is 
floating–price, and zero otherwise. Since the interest rate on a fixed-rate issue does not change during the 
life of the loan, these notes do not fluctuate and are typically protected to avoid the risk of rising interest 
rates. We expect borrowers to raise funds at a higher spread through fixed-priced issues rather than through 
floating-priced issues. For this reason, a positive sign is expected for a fixed rate issue.  Floating is the 
omitted category. However, statistical significance could be poor as the risk inherent to rising interest rates 
is already reflected in the rating of the loan issue.  
 
4.4  Expected Systematic Risk Characteristics 
 The third set of explanatory variables affecting loan spread is systematic risk characteristics of the 
loan (group C.). The following factors used here represent systematic characteristics: country of origin, 
creditor rights, enforcement, and finally currency risk. A discussion of these variables and expected impact 
on primary market will follow below.  
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN represents the country in which the assets are originated. Country should 
capture cross-country differences in macro-economic conditions that are not already incorporated into an 
issue rating. Gabbi and Sironi (2005) included issues originated in Canada, Europe, Japan and the United 
States of America in the full-loan sample, but found no country statistically significant in explaining the 
loan spread. Thus, we would expect to find an insignificant coefficient. However, Hill (1998) argues that 
structuring the transaction in emerging markets – in order to minimize investor’ exposure to political risk - 
presents a challenge. Although the transaction structure minimizes investors’ exposure to political risk, it is 
not eliminated. The authors argue that in the event of a crisis, investors price the risk that the originator’s 
government may attempt to interfere and redirect these payments in violation of the security documents.  
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 In our analysis we constructed a dummy variable based on the country of origin. EMERGING: 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the issue is originated in an emerging market, zero otherwise. 
DEVELOPED:  dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the issue is originated in a developed market. We 
believe that the country of origin plays a role in the risk perceived by investors. Thus, we expect to find a 
positive coefficient for emerging markets. However, its statistical significance could be poor as the risk 
inherent to an emerging market country is already reflected in the rating of an issue. DEVELOPED is the 
omitted category. 
Legal risk is important since it incorporates the control and cash flow rights various lenders 
receive at bankruptcy. Ayotte and Gaon (2005) argue that avoidance of dilution of their claim in a standard 
bankruptcy of the sponsor is valuable to creditors in a way that is observable in prices. In order to analyze 
the legal framework, we gathered data on the creditor rights in the countries where the assets are originated. 
As a testament to the importance of a legal framework, credit rating agencies explicitly analyze the ability 
to take control over the assets exhibited by the investors. We measured CREDITOR RIGHTS using La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) indices. We used five creditor rights variables in this 
analysis, and added up the scores to create a creditor rights index (see Esty and Megginson, 2003). The 
analysis is reported in Table 4.17  
****Insert Table 4 about here**** 
 
The creditor rights index runs from 0 (weak protection) to 4 (strong protection). Unfortunately, 
this index presents two problems. First, La Porta et al. (2000) indices are based on a single point in time 
and therefore do not reflect any changing legal conditions over our six-year sample period. Second, the 
index yields a number of counter-intuitive results (see Esty and Megginson, 2003). For example, Zimbabwe 
                                                 
 
17  Column 1 of Table 4 represents the country of interest. The first variable is no automatic stay on the assets (see column 2), 
preventing secured creditors from getting possession of loan collateral. In contrast, secured creditors can pull collateral from firms 
being reorganized, a right that is of value to them. The second variable is secured creditors paid first (see column 3), in other words 
the assurance that the secured creditors have absolute priority over the collateral in a reorganization process.  Third, there is restriction 
for going into reorganization (see column 4), and here creditor consent is needed to file for reorganization. Hence, managers cannot so 
easily escape creditor demands. Fourth, we have management does not stay in reorganizations (see column 5), as is the case in the 
United Kingdom, where the creditors have the power to replace management. Column 6 represents the scores to create a creditor 
rights index. 
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 and Egypt are classified as having the strongest creditor rights while Australia and the U.S. are classified as 
having weak creditor rights. In order to cope with these counter-intuitive results, we also measured the 
strength of a country’s legal system with the help of Laporta et al. (2000) indices since creditor rights are of 
limited use if they cannot be enforced. In principle, a strong system of legal enforcement could substitute 
for weak creditor rights, since well-functioning courts can help investors by management in distress. We 
measured ENFORCEMENT using La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) indices. We 
used five enforcement variables in the analysis and added up the scores to create an enforcement index. The 
analysis is reported in Table 5.18  
****Insert Table 5 about here**** 
 
The enforcement index runs from 0 (weak enforcement) to 50 (strong enforcement). According to 
La Porta et al. (2000), the first two measures in Table 5 pertain to law enforcement, with the last three 
dealing more generally with the government’s stance toward business. The results provide a number of 
strong but intuitively more likely results. For example, the Philippines and Pakistan are classified as having 
the weakest law enforcement system, while Norway and Switzerland are classified as having the strongest 
enforcement system.  
And so, in our sample, we measured both the CREDITOR RIGHTS and ENFORCEMENT in the 
countries where the assets are originated. A positive coefficient may be expected for issues originated in 
countries with weaker legal frameworks (lower legal risk), and a lower spread for issues originated in 
countries with stronger legal rights. Still, the impact may not be significant since legal risk is already 
reflected into the credit rating of the issue.  
CURRENCY RISK is defined as the risk that is run if the currency in which the loan is repaid 
differs from the borrower's home country currency. Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a loan is 
                                                 
18  Column 1 of Table 5 represents the country of interest. The first variable is efficiency of the judicial system (see column 2), 
an assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business. Second, the rule of law (see column 3) 
represents an assessment of the law and order tradition in the country.  Third, corruption (see column 4) is the assessment of the 
corruption in government. Third, risk of expropriation by the government (see column 5) gives an assessment of the risk of outright 
confiscation or forced nationalization. Fourth, likelihood of contract repudiation by the government (see column 6) is the assessment 
of the risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of repudiation, postponement or scaling down. Column 7 represents the 
scores to create an enforcement index. 
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 exposed to currency risk, and zero otherwise. Kleimeier and Megginson (2001) found the currency risk to 
be statistically highly significant and positive. However, after controlling for credit rating, the authors 
found a positive but insignificant coefficient. Thus, issues exposed to currency risk have higher spreads 
than issues not exposed to currency risk. However, an insignificant coefficient is expected since currency 
risk is already reflected in the credit rating of the issue. 
All independent variables are discrete with the exception of credit rating,  loan to value, maturity, 
loan tranche size, transaction size, number of tranches, number of lead managers, number of credit rating 
agencies, creditor rights and finally enforcement, all of which are continuous. The results for the spread 
regressions are included in the next section. 
 
 
5.  Regression Results 
This section reports the results of Regression #1 of Table 6. These empirical results present 
collateral and other pricing characteristics that affect the primary market spread for the sample of 968 
ABS. They are analyzed for two reasons. The first is to investigate whether securitized assets that cannot 
easily be replaced have a significant positive impact on the primary market spread relative to assets that can 
easily be obtained. The second reason is to analyze the other pricing characteristics that emerge as 
important measures for the primary market spread of an ABS issue.  
****Insert Table 6 about here**** 
 
F tests for whether the coefficients are jointly different from zero as well as adjusted R2 are 
reported at the bottom of the table. Variations in the specifications reported in column 1 of Table 6 were 
estimated in order to asses the robustness of the conclusions concerning the determinants of the primary 
market spreads of ABS. The robustness checks will be discussed in detail in Section 6. 
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 5.1  Determinants of Asset-Backed Securities 
In this subsection, the results of Regression #1 of Table 6 are discussed. This analysis starts with 
A.) default and recovery risk characteristics, followed by B.) the expected marketability characteristics of 
the loan and C.) systemic risk characteristics. We shall start with the analysis regarding the impact of the 
nature of assets on the spread associated with the default and recovery risk characteristics category.  
 
5.1.A.  Default and Recovery Risk Characteristics 
Ayotte and Gaon (2005) argued that asset securitization is most efficient when the backing assets 
are replaceable only. In a sponsor default, replaceable assets can easily be obtained from outside sources at 
a competitive price. However, when the securitized assets are necessary for operations and the firm cannot 
easily replace them by resorting to outside markets, securitization may lead to inefficient hold-ups. Thus, 
we would expect a higher spread for securities backed by assets that cannot easily be replaced. 
Unfortunately, the sign of the coefficient cannot be determined clearly for all assets that serve as collateral 
for an asset securitization issue, since the assets exhibit a wide variety of payoff characteristics.  
 Nonetheless, in particular, we expect a positive coefficient for whole business loans and future 
receivables on the one hand, and a negative coefficient for automobile loans and credit card receivables on 
the other. However, since we wish to control for other pricing characteristics, such as credit rating for 
example, statistical significance could be poor as the risk inherent to an asset type is already reflected in the 
rating of a securitization issue. The opposite is in fact true. We found many collateral dummy variables 
with statistically significant positive (CONSUMER, FUTURE, AIRCRAFT LEASE, EQUIPMENT 
LEASE, OTHER, WHOLE BUSINESS) or negative (CREDIT CARD) coefficients. Lenders demand up to 
61.6 basis points as a premium. This result is relatively surprising as ratings should already have captured 
differences in collateral’s ability to repay interest and principal in a worst-case scenario.  
Our empirical findings concerning the nature of the assets trigger two considerations. First, the 
primary market spread for securitization issues with backing assets that cannot easily be replaced is on 
average significantly higher relative to issues with assets that can easily be obtained. Therefore, we reject 
the hypothesis. At the one end of the spectrum, we have whole business loans (WHOLE BUSINESS) and 
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 future receivables (FUTURE) that show a dramatic and significant increase in the average spread relative to 
automobile loans (AUTO) and that are therefore considered more risky. This can be explained by the fact 
that both whole business loans and future receivables are associated with unique assets that cannot easily be 
replaced by the originator. At the other end of the spectrum, we have credit card receivables (CREDIT 
CARD) that report a significant decrease in spread relative to automobile loans and that are considered less 
risky. Credit card receivables are loans granted to consumers in order to finance the purchase of goods and 
services, and are, in fact, relatively easy to replace in a constructed portfolio.  
Second, the average credit ratings may not provide unbiased estimates of expected recovery rates. 
An intriguing explanation for the relationship between spread and the nature of assets might be that rating 
agencies fail to fully incorporate managerial incentives when assigning ratings. In particular, if the 
collateralized debt is secured on an asset value which is difficult to destroy, agency problems reduce 
expected payoff less than the payoff of collateralized debt secured on an asset value that is less difficult to 
destroy. In our analysis, a constructed portfolio of future receivables and of whole business may be 
considered relatively sensitive to managerial incentives, whereas a portfolio of credit card receivables and 
automobile loans might not be. For example, the originator intends to repay the securities associated with 
future receivables and whole business out of the cash flows generated from its operating assets, while the 
repayment associated with automobile loans and credit card receivables depends on the ability of many 
consumers to repay their loan. As a result, agency problems may reduce expected payoff more in the case 
of whole business and future receivables than they would reduce payoff related to automobile loans and 
credit card receivables. Thus, if rating agencies fail to fully incorporate managerial incentives when 
assigning ratings, lenders are enticed to participate by being offered higher spreads for securities considered 
to be relatively more sensitive to managerial incentives, and lower spreads for securities considered to be 
the least sensitive.  
We shall now start with the analysis of the impact of other default and recovery risk characteristics 
on spread. Almost all CREDIT RATING dummies are statistically significant at the 1% level, and the 
pattern presented by the coefficient dummies indicates that spreads rise when ratings worsen.  
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 LOAN TO VALUE has a negative significant coefficient. On average, a 1% increase in the level 
of subordination decreases spread by 24.8 basis points. This finding is consistent with the fact that issues 
with a higher loan to value ratio require a lower spread, though this is still surprising as credit ratings 
should capture differences in expected recovery rates in case of default.  
The FINANCE HOUSE and SOVEREIGN dummy variables have statistically significant negative 
coefficients, and the INSURANCE dummy reports a positive significant coefficient.  Neither the BANK 
nor the PUBLIC dummies are statistically significant. Although these results clearly suggest that the 
strength of the sponsor matters when pricing the debt of the SPV, financial institutions per se do not report 
a significantly different average spread in comparison to the spread of corporates. We can offer two 
possible explanations for these results. First, it could be the case that finance houses and sovereign 
borrowers have relatively stronger institutional features (size, riskiness of operations, reputation etc.) that 
act to decrease loan spread relative to the loan spread charged to corporate borrowers: by 29.9 basis points 
for sovereign borrowers and 17.4 basis points for finance houses. Second, spread charged to insurance 
borrowers is relatively higher than the spread charged to corporates: by an average 112.9 in our analysis, 
because - in general - the assets originated by insurance companies chosen as “collateralizable” happen to 
be relatively riskier than average. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that the nature of the originator is a 
significant determinant of the spread, besides credit rating and other characteristics.  
The LOWMATURITY and HIGHMATURITY dummy variables both have coefficients with the 
expected signs, but the low maturity dummy is insignificant. As was expected, borrowers are willing to 
incur, and lenders demand, higher spreads (10.8 basis points) for loans with longer maturity. Thus, long-
tenor issues are prohibitively more expensive, even after controlling for the nature of the assets and credit 
rating. Surprisingly, the ENHANCEMENT dummy variable has a negative significant coefficient. The use 
of credit enhancement does in fact decrease spread by 22.1 basis points. The most logical interpretation of 
this particular result is that investors require a lower risk premium than the premium implicit in the 
upgrading applied by rating agencies.  Nevertheless, this result is still surprising.  
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 5.1.B.  Marketability Characteristics 
The PERIOD II dummy variable has a weak, statistically significant negative coefficient, 
indicating that an increase in marketability over time would, in fact, imply a narrowing of spreads (by -8.2 
basis points) over time. LOAN SIZE has a positive coefficient, although not significant. TRANSACTION 
SIZE has a negative coefficient, although not statistically significant either. These insignificant results may 
stem from the wide variety of collateral taken into account in the regression analysis. 
 # TRANCHES is not statistically significant. Thus, we do not find support for a significant 
positive relationship between the number of tranches and the pricing of securities after controlling for credit 
rating and other pricing characteristics. The EUROMARKET dummy variable has a positive significant 
coefficient, indicating that those issues placed in euromarkets have higher spreads (14.1 basis points) than 
issues placed in other markets. This result may stem from the fact that the euromarket forms the largest 
market by far, relative to other markets. Differences in liquidity and credit standing of Interbank Offered 
Rates in the euromarket relative to other markets could explain why issues in the euromarket have higher 
spreads. 
 # LEAD MANAGERS indicates that booking a loan with an original number of lead managers of 
one more reduces average spread by 7.8 basis points. # RATING AGENCIES has a negative coefficient 
and is not significant. Thus, we do not find significant evidence to prove that an increase in the number of 
credit rating agencies involved in rating the issue is able to achieve, ceteris paribus, a lower spread.  
The TAP dummy variable has a positive insignificant coefficient, indicating that growth in 
secondary market activity may already be incorporated into the credit rating of the issue. The FIXED 
dummy variable is significant and positive. Lenders demand an average premium of 21.5 basis points for 
fixed rate credits in comparison with floating rate credits. This result is consistent with the expectation that 
- on average - borrowers manage to raise funds at a higher spread through fixed-priced issues than through 
floating-priced issues; the interest on these notes does not fluctuate and are typically protected to avoid the 
risk of rising interest rates.  
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 The RETAINED dummy variable is positive and insignificant, as expected. This finding indicates 
that no extra risk premium is associated with the retained interest relative to an ordinary loan tranche sold 
to other investors.  
 
5.1.C  Systemic Risk Characteristics 
The EMERGING dummy variable has a positive significant coefficient, indicating that lending to 
a borrower with collateral originated in emerging countries would increase spreads on average by 75.2 
basis points. This is consistent with our prediction that borrowers view collateral originated in emerging 
countries as more risky.  
The CREDITOR RIGHTS index is positive and insignificant. The other legal risk variable, 
ENFORCEMENT, has a positive and insignificant coefficient as well. These insignificant signs may 
indicate that legal risk is already reflected in the credit rating of the issue. Finally, the CURRENCY RISK 
dummy variable has a positive relationship with spread. Although not significant, this finding suggests that 
a mismatch between the currency of the originating country on the one hand and the currency of the loan 
repayment on the other hand increases the rate charged on an average issue by 9.5 basis points. 
 
5.2 Regression Results: Conclusions 
Table 7 reports the adjusted R2 and F-test results of Regression #1 associated with the three main 
groups of explanatory variables that emerge as relevant to determine primary market spreads. These 
empirical results were analyzed to identify collateral and other pricing characteristics that affect the 
primary market.  
****Insert Table 7 about here**** 
 
 Three main results emerge from this analysis.  
1. Default and recovery risk characteristics form the most important group in explaining loan spread 
variability. We found evidence that on average the primary market spread for securitization issues with 
backing assets that cannot easily be replaced is significantly higher relative to issues with assets that 
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 can easily be obtained. Additionally, within the group of default and recovery risk characteristics, 
credit rating dummies are the most important variables to determine primary market spread: credit 
rating has an adjusted R2 of 0.61 (defined as R2c in Regression #1).  
2. Systemic risk does not improve the adjusted R2 (from 0.70 to 0.69). Nevertheless, we found that issues 
originated in emerging markets tend to have significantly higher spreads than issues originated in 
developed countries.  
3. Including marketability characteristics significantly improves the resulting adjusted R2, from 0.70 to 
0.77. This result suggests that the marketability characteristics are the second most important group of 
explanatory variables to determine primary market spreads. 
  
 
6. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we estimated the variations of the specifications reported in column 1 of Table 6 in 
order to asses the robustness of the conclusions concerning the impact of collateral and other pricing 
characteristics on the primary market spread. Since we concluded that an increase in marketability over 
time would imply a narrowing of spreads over time, the first check of robustness investigated any temporal 
evolution in the relevant pricing factors that affected primary market spreads. Using a unique common 
sample could produce misleading results if investors evaluated loan tranches issued in these two periods 
differently or if they attributed a different relevance to common factors. We ran a separate regression for 
the sub-sample between 1999 and 2001 (Regression #2) and those issued between 2002 and 2005 
(Regression #3 and #4).  
The second check of robustness was aimed at investigating which collateral and other pricing 
characteristics had a substantially different impact on the spread in a comparison between originators.  
Using a unique common sample could produce misleading results if investors evaluated originators 
differently. This check was performed by running separate regressions for banks (Regression #5), finance 
houses (Regression #6) and finally corporates (regression #7 and #8). We restricted our analysis to banks, 
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 corporates and finance houses because the majority of issues in our sub-sample have been originated by 
banks (47.3%), corporates (21.5%) and finance houses (23.6%).  
Since a substantial number of issues is placed on euromarkets, the third check of robustness was 
aimed at investigating which collateral and other pricing characteristics had a substantially different impact 
on the spread in the comparison between the euromarket and other markets. Using a unique common 
sample could produce misleading results if investors evaluated these two types of markets differently. This 
check was performed by running separate regressions for the sub-sample placed on the euromarket 
(Regression #9 and #10) and placed on other markets (Regression #11).  
Finally, a fourth check was performed by running an additional regression to investigate whether a 
different rating assigned by the three rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) had any statistically significant 
impact on spreads (Regression #12). 
 
6.1  Time of the Issue 
The first check of robustness investigated any temporal evolution in the relevant pricing factors 
affecting primary market spreads in the period 1999-2005. This check was performed by running separate 
regressions for the sub-sample of loan tranches issued in 1999-2001 and for those issued in the 2002-2005 
period. Results of the period 1999-2001 are reported in Regression #2 of Table 6.  Because of severe 
correlation between the nature of the assets and the type of originator, two different specifications of the 
period 2002-2005 were compiled. The results of the period 2002-2005 are reported in Regressions #3 and 
#4 of Table 6. 19 
Only few substantial differences emerge between the sub-samples, and these will be discussed 
below. The adjusted R2 of 0.78 for the 1999-2001 sub-sample (Regression #2) compared with 0.76 for the 
2002-2005 sub-sample (Regression #4) indicates that the independent variables used in the regressions 
explain a similar portion of the spreads’ variability. Most CR dummies (credit rating) are statistically 
significant with the expected sign and have very similar coefficients for the three sub-samples (Figure 1). 
                                                 
19  This empirical design was needed to solve severe correlation between some explanatory variables.  We do not report 
collinearity tests here in the interests of space, these results are available upon request.   It is however important to realize that 
Regression #3 does not employ type of originator (but with nature of the assets included) , and that Regression #4 does not employ 
nature of the assets (but with type of originator included).  
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 However, the explanatory power of the rating dummy variables has decreased, as indicated by the lower 
R2c of the 2002-2005 sub-sample in comparison with the 1999-2001 sub-sample (0.51 versus 0.69). This 
result indicates that credit ratings may not provide unbiased assessments of expected default or recovery 
rates, and that this bias tends to be stronger in the 2002-2005 period. Furthermore, the BANK dummy 
variable has a weak positive significant coefficient in the 1999-2001 period, and a negative and significant 
coefficient in the 2002-2005 period. This is most likely the result of investors changing their assessment 
from a relatively non-favorable view to a more favorable one concerning the recovery rates for banks.  
Regarding the maturity of the issue, we found the dummy variable LOWMATURITY to be highly 
significant in the 1999-2001 sub-sample, and insignificant in the 2002-2005 sub-sample. We offer two 
possible explanations. As a first explanation, it could be that lenders perceived issues with a shorter 
maturity in the period 1999-2001 as less risky. A second explanation may be that investors were relatively 
less familiar with asset -backed securities in the first period than in the second. This could have led 
investors to favor issues with a shorter maturity over issues with a relatively longer period, thereby 
demanding a lower spread on the shorter maturities.  
Other minor differences between the two periods - such as the statistical insignificance of a 
number of asset-type dummies within the 1999-2001 sub-sample and statistical significance within 2002-
2005 - are most likely the consequence of the different composition of the sub-samples. Nevertheless, the 
signs of the coefficients are all similar in the two periods: whole business, for example, remains highly 
significant in both sub-samples.  Furthermore, the EUROMARKET dummy variable reports a strongly 
positive significant coefficient in the 2002-2005 sub-sample, and insignificant and positive in the 1999-
2001 sub-sample. This may be explained by a strong increase over time in liquidity and credit standing of 
the Interbank Offered Rates for issues in the euromarket relative to other markets.   
Finally, while the RETAINED dummy variable is insignificant in the period 1999-2001, it is 
statistically highly significant in the period 2002-2005. Still, the coefficient and the level of significance 
decrease when the nature of the assets is included in the regression. Nevertheless, an issue that is retained 
by the originator reports a significant average increase of 81.0 basis points in the period 2002-2005. This 
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 could be explained by a higher perceived risk on the part of the originator due to increased experience in 
analyzing the default losses on the underlying collateral pool in time.  
 
6.2  Type of Originator 
The second check of robustness was aimed at investigating which collateral and other pricing 
characteristics had a substantially different impact on the spread in a comparison between originators.  This 
check was performed by running separate regressions for the sub-sample of banks (Regression #5), finance 
houses (Regression #6) and corporates (regression #7 and #8).20 Few substantial differences emerge 
between the sub-samples, and these will be discussed below. 
The adjusted R2 of 0.71 for banks (Regression #5) compared with the R2 of 0.83 for finance 
houses (Regression #6) and compared with the 0.88 for corporates (Regression #7) indicates that the 
independent variables used in the regression explain a higher portion of the spread variability in the 
corporates and finance houses sub-samples than in the banks sub-sample. This can be explained partly by 
the difference in explanatory power of the CR dummies (credit rating), as reflected in the adjusted R2c of 
0.76 and 0.63 for the corporates and banks sub-samples respectively. We found no substantial difference in 
adjusted R2c between banks and finance houses: in both regressions, credit rating dummies explain 
approximately 0.64 of the spread variability. Although all rating dummies are significant, clearly, the rating 
dummies in the three sub-samples do not have very similar coefficients (Figure 2). These results may 
indicate that equally rated financial firms (banks and finance houses) and non-financial firms (corporates) 
are perceived by investors to have different default and recovery risk.  
Furthermore, no originator shows a stronger significant relationship between the 
LOWMATURITY dummy variable and the spread than banks do. Typical issues by banks with a maturity 
of less than 5 years reduce the spread significantly by 28.3 basis points in comparison with issues with a 
maturity between 5-15 years. We also found the HIGHMATURITY dummy to be highly significant with a 
positive coefficient in the corporates sub-sample only. Lenders demand - on average - 49.8 basis points 
                                                 
20  Here, too, some categories were left out to solve severe correlation between some explanatory variables. It is important to 
realize that whole business and high maturity were severely correlated. For this reason, we estimated two regressions: Regression #7 
without nature of assets (but with maturity included) and Regression #8 without maturity (but with nature of assets included).  
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 more for corporate issues with a maturity greater than 15 years, and 22.1 basis points less if the issue has a 
maturity less than 5 years. We can offer two explanations. First, assets of banks generally support debt 
better than corporate assets. Second, investors may find it more difficult to evaluate default and recovery 
rate in the case of corporate assets with a longer maturity, because there are institutional features (lower 
degree of information disclosure in comparison with banks, financial nature of corporate assets, etc.) that 
act to increase loan rates with a longer maturity and that decrease rates with a shorter maturity.   
With respect to the nature of the assets, we find most assets with similar coefficients and signs 
among originators, although there are two exceptions. The CREDIT CARD dummy is statistically highly 
significant with a negative coefficient in the banks sub-sample only, and the WHOLE BUSINESS dummy 
is statistically significant with a positive coefficient in the corporates sub-sample only. These differences 
are most likely the consequence of the different composition of the two sub-samples. Indeed, most of the 
credit card issues were originated by banks, and most of the whole business transactions were completed by 
corporates (see Table 3). Also, we find TRANSACTION SIZE weakly significant with a negative 
coefficient in the corporates and finance houses sub-samples, and insignificant and negative in the banks 
sub-sample. This negative and significant impact of transaction size on the spread could indicate that 
investors - on average - associate larger issues originated by corporates and finance houses with a positive 
price liquidity effect related to the size of the entire issue. Alternatively, it may simply be the case that 
larger issues by corporates and finance houses are funded more efficiently than could otherwise be 
arranged.  
Finally, the FIXED RATE dummy variable has a strong, significant coefficient in the corporates 
sub-sample, and an insignificant one in the banks and finance houses sub-samples. Lenders demand an 
average premium of up to 42.2 basis points for a fixed-rate security. Obviously, it is more likely for 
financial institutions to have a competitive advantage in managing the risk of rising interest rates in their 
portfolio more efficiently than corporates. Nevertheless, this result indicates that corporates have to pay a 
significantly higher spread through fixed-priced issues than through floating-priced issues in comparison 
with financial institutions. 
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 6.3 Type of Market 
The third check of robustness was aimed at investigating which collateral and other pricing 
characteristics have a substantially different impact on the spread in a comparison between the euromarket 
and other markets. This check was performed by running separate regressions for the sub-sample placed on 
the euromarket (Regression #9 and #10) and placed on other markets (Regression #11).21  
Once again, most CR dummies (credit rating) are statistically significant concerning the expected 
signs for all sub-samples, and they have very similar coefficients. The adjusted R2c of 0.61 for the 
euromarket sub-sample compared with 0.63 for the other markets sub-sample indicates that the credit rating 
dummies used in the regressions explain a similar portion of the spreads’ variability. Furthermore, four 
substantial differences emerge between the three sub-samples.  
First, the BANK and SOVEREIGN dummy variables are highly significant with a negative 
coefficient in the euromarket sample only, and not significant in the other markets sample. This would 
seem to indicate that investors perceive loan tranches issued by banks and sovereign in the euromarket as 
less risky in comparison with those issued in other markets. In such cases, it might be that a higher degree 
of evaluation is inherent to issues in the euromarket, which is translated into a lower required risk premium 
by lenders.  
Second, most asset dummies are weakly significant in the other markets sub-sample and highly 
significant in the euromarket. This is most likely the consequence of a different composition in the sub-
samples and a lower availability of issues in other markets compared to the euromarket. Indeed, we found a 
substantially higher variation of assets included in the euromarket sub-sample and a lower availability of 
issues in other markets as is shown by the regression results in Table 6.  The question whether these other 
markets are less advanced than euromarkets remains unanswered. It merits greater in-depth analysis than 
we can provide here. 
Third, TRANSACTION SIZE is not statistically significant in the euromarket sub-sample, but it is 
significant with a positive coefficient in the other markets sub-sample. This could indicate that investors - 
                                                 
21  Here, too, some categories were left out. It is important to realize that nature of the assets and type of originator were 
severely correlated. For this reason, we estimated two regressions: Regression #9 without nature of assets (but with type of originator 
included) and Regression #10 without type of originator (but with nature of assets included).  
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 on average - associate larger transactions placed on markets other than the euromarket with lower ex-post 
liquidity.  
Fourth, while the FIXED dummy is statistically significant with the expected positive coefficient 
in the euromarket sub-sample, it is negatively significant in the other markets. An explanation could be that 
lenders in other markets prefer fixed-priced issues to control more efficiently for rising interest rates in 
comparison with lenders in the euromarket. As a result, lenders are willing to incur lower spreads for loans 
with fixed interest rates in these other markets than what was implied in their original credit rating. 
 
6.4  Discordance 
The final check of robustness concerned consistent use of credit ratings by Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s and finally Fitch. Nomura (2003) reported that the National Economic Research Associates’ study 
on structured finance ratings could not rule out the possibility of substantial performance differences 
among the rating agencies. Likewise, the summary of the study’s findings reports that rating agencies agree 
with each other somewhat less often than might be expected.  
An additional regression (Regression #12) was run to see whether a different rating assigned by 
any of the three rating agencies had any statistically significant impact on loan issuance spreads. We 
included a DISCO dummy variable, which is one if the ratings assigned by different agencies have a 
different numerical value, and which is zero if the ratings assigned have the same value. A dummy variable 
of one is irrespective of whether the difference between credit ratings is equal to one or more notches. In 
both regressions (Regression #1 and #12), all CR dummies (credit rating) are statistically significant 
concerning the expected signs and have very similar coefficients.  
The disco dummy variable has a statistically significant negative coefficient, although it is very 
weak. This result indicates that rating agencies discordance leads to a lower loan spread (-11.1 basis points) 
in our sample. This finding suggests that investors interpreted the differences in credit rating by the 
agencies as an indication of a lower degree of uncertainty concerning default risk and recovery risk than 
what was implied in their original rating. 
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 6.5 Robustness Checks: Conclusions 
This subsection reports on several robustness checks performed upon our conclusions concerning 
the impact of collateral and other pricing characteristics on primary market spread. The coefficients and 
relevance associated with the nature of the assets dummy variables tend to be similar in most regressions. 
Indeed, the primary market spread for securitization issues with backing assets that cannot easily be 
replaced tends on average to be significantly higher relative to issues with assets that can easily be 
obtained. We found, for example, that whole business loans and future receivables show a dramatic and 
significant increase in the average spread relative to automobile loans. They are therefore considered more 
risky. Also, we saw that credit card receivables report a significant decrease in spread relative to 
automobile loans and that they are considered less risky.  
In our robustness checks dealing with the other pricing characteristics, we found few, but 
nevertheless important, differences among sub-samples that are of interest in pricing asset-backed 
securities.  
We focused our robustness analysis on four main areas.   
1. In the first area, we investigated any temporal evolution in the relevant pricing factors that affect 
primary market spreads. We found substantial differences, dealing with the credit rating, impact of 
maturity, euromarket and retained interest on the spread.  
2. In the second area, we studied the question whether investors evaluate originators differently. We 
found substantial differences between originators, mainly in the impact of credit rating, maturity, 
transaction size and fixed rate on the spread.   
3. In the third area, we focused on any differences in evaluation between euromarket and other markets, 
classified by investors. Here, we found substantial differences in the impact of issues originated by 
banks, transaction size and fixed rate on the spread.  
4. Finally, the fourth area deals with the consistent use of credit ratings. We found a very weak impact on 
the spread associated with the difference in credit rating by the agencies.  
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 7. Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to provide empirical evidence showing a relationship between the 
nature of the assets and the primary market spread. The model also provides predictions on how other 
pricing characteristics affect spread, since little is known about how and why spreads of asset-backed 
securities are influenced by loan tranche characteristics. Our sample represents a relatively large part of the 
asset-backed securitization issues (non-U.S.) booked in the international capital markets in the period 1999-
2005 - 968 loans in total, with an aggregate value in excess of €178 billion.  
We find that default and recovery risk characteristics represent the most important group in 
explaining loan spread variability. Within this group, the credit rating dummies are the most important 
variables to determine loan spread at issue. Nonetheless, credit rating is not a sufficient statistic for the 
determination of spreads. We find that the nature of the assets has a substantial impact on the spread across 
all samples, indicating that primary market spread with backing assets that cannot easily be replaced is 
significantly higher relative to issues with assets that can easily be obtained. Of the remaining 
characteristics, only marketability explains a significant portion of the spreads’ variability.  
While most default and recovery characteristics - as measured by variables such as credit rating, 
loan to value, type of originator, enhancements, and nature of assets - represent relevant variables in 
explaining loan spread variability, systemic risk characteristics  - as measured by legal and currency risk - 
appear to be poor explanatory variables. The same poor results emerge for variables measuring 
marketability characteristics such as loan tranche size, transaction size, number of tranches, number of lead 
managers, number of credit rating agencies, tap issuance, and finally retained interest.  
In addition, variations of the specifications were estimated in order to asses the robustness of the 
conclusions concerning these determinants of loan spreads. We found few, but nevertheless important, 
differences among sub-samples that are of interest in pricing asset-backed securities. Three main results 
emerge from this analysis. First, empirical evidence indicates that credit ratings may not provide unbiased 
assessments of expected default or recovery rates. This bias tends to be stronger in the period 2002-2005. 
Second, the rating dummies in the sub-sample of banks, finance houses and corporates do not have very 
similar coefficients. These results may indicate that equally rated financial firms (banks and finance 
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 houses) and non-financial firms (corporates) are perceived by investors to have different default and 
recovery risk levels. Third, although we find very similar coefficients for most of the variables associated 
with the issues placed on euromarkets and other markets, we find in our sample less variation of types of 
originators and nature of underlying assets in other markets in comparison with euromarkets. The question 
whether these other markets are less advanced than euromarkets remains unanswered. 
To our knowledge, ours is the first full-scale empirical analysis of how asset-backed securities are 
priced. It has been demonstrated that the determinants of primary market spreads are relevant for different 
financial market participants. Financial institutions and corporations wishing to raise funds in the asset-
backed markets may obtain reasonable estimates of the average spread that they would face. Also, rating 
agencies may obtain empirical information about the way their credit risk evaluations are perceived by 
investors. Whether the determinants of primary market spreads change after the issue will be of interest to 
explore in future research projects. 
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 Table 1: Key pricing characteristics of ABS full sample compared with ABS sub-sample  
(1) Variable of interest (4) Surv. Rate
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
dependent variable:
primary market spread (bp) 1,472 99.2 133.1 968 84.9 103.3 65.8%
independent variables:
default and recovery risk characteristics:
credit rating class [1-21 weak] 1,939 3.9 3.5 968 3.9 3.4 49.9%
loan to value (%) 1,556 18.0% 24.1% 968 19.9 25.2% 62.2%
type of originator:
■ bank 2,289 47.3% - 968 58.7% - 42.3%
■ corporate 2,289 21.5% - 968 16.7% - 42.3%
■ finance house 2,289 23.6% - 968 15.2% - 42.3%
■ insurance company 2,289 0.7% - 968 0.2% - 42.3%
■ public entity 2,289 5.2% - 968 7.0% - 42.3%
■ sovereign 2,289 1.5% - 968 2.2% - 42.3%
maturity (years) 2,118 11.3 9.8 968 14.0 10.1 45.7%
loans with credit enhancement 2,427 7.6% - 968 8.9% - 39.9%
nature of assets:
■ aircraft leases 2,427 1.7% - 968 0.7% - 39.9%
■ automobile loans 2,427 17.2% - 968 15.1% - 39.9%
■ consumer loans 2,427 7.7% - 968 9.8% - 39.9%
■ credit card receivables 2,427 7.5% - 968 8.2% - 39.9%
■ equipment leases 2,427 13.3% - 968 13.4% - 39.9%
■ future receivables 2,427 3.0% - 968 0.1% - 39.9%
■ other loans 2,427 24.5% - 968 15.5% - 39.9%
■ small business loans 2,427 14.5% - 968 20.0% - 39.9%
■ whole business loans 2,427 10.9% - 968 15.9% - 39.9%
marketability characteristics:
time of the issue: 
■ period I (1999-2002) 2,427 52.9% - 968 58.2% - 39.9%
■ period I (2003-2005) 2,427 47.1% - 968 41.8% - 39.9%
loan tranche size (Euro millions) 2,417 150.3 305.1 968 177.8 304.4 40.0%
transaction size (Euro millions) 765 475.1 640.1 221 675.3 768.2 28.9%
number of tranches 765 3.2 3.1 221 3.6 2.5 28.9%
type of primary market:
■ euromarket 2,427 51.1% - 968 84.0% - 39.9%
■ other markets 2,427 49.9% - 968 16.0% - 39.9%
number of lead managers 2,417 1.4 0.7 968 1.5 0.7 40.0%
number of credit rating agencies 2,207 3.8 0.8 968 4.0 0.7 43.9%
tap issue 2,427 2.1% - 968 3.1% - 39.9%
retained issue 2,427 4.9% - 968 1.7% - 39.9%
type of interest rate:
■ loans with fixed rate 2,034 41.4% - 968 21.6% - 47.6%
■ loans with floating rate 2,034 58.6% - 968 78.4% - 47.6%
(2) ABS full sample (3) ABS sub-sample
 
 
 
 
 48
 Table 1: Key pricing characteristics of ABS full sample compared with ABS sub-sample (continued) 
(1) Variable of interest (4) Surv. Rate
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
(2) ABS full sample (3) ABS sub-sample
 
systemic risk characteristics:
country of origin:
■ emerging countries 2,076 13.6% - 968 1.0% - 46.6%
■ developed countries 2,076 86.4% - 968 99.0% - 46.6%
LLSV creditor rights [0-4 strong] 2,094 2.4 1.0 968 2.4 1.1 46.2%
LLSV enforcement [0-50 strong] 2,094 43.1 5.1 968 43.9 4.0 46.2%
currency risk 2,234 13.3% - 968 8.8% - 43.3%
 
Column 1 represents the pricing variables. Column 2 presents number, mean, and standard deviation associated with each 
pricing variable in the full sample. Column 3 presents number, mean, and standard deviation associated with each pricing variable in 
the sub-sample. Column 4 presents the survival rate for each variable. The survival rate is calculated as the number of issues in the full 
sample divided by the number of issues in the sub-sample. 
 
 
Source: Structured Finance International; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49
 Table 2: Credit rating scales 
 
Moody's
Standard & 
Poor's Fitch
Value
1 Aaa AAA AAA
2 Aa1 AA+ AA+
3 Aa2 AA AA
4 Aa3 AA- AA-
5 A1 A+ A+
6 A2 A A
7 A3 A- A-
8 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+
9 Baa2 BBB BBB
10 Baa3 BBB- BBB-
11 Ba1 BB+ BB+
12 Ba2 BB BB
13 Ba3 BB- BB-
14 B1 B+ B+
15 B2 B B
16 B3 B- B-
17 Caa1 CCC+ CCC+
18 Caa2 CCC+ CCC+
19 Caa3 CCC- CCC-
20 - CC CC
21 - D D
Rating agency
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Table 3: Asset-backed securitization issues by class categorized by type of originator 
 
Corporate Bank 
Finance 
house Sovereign
Public 
entity
Insurance 
company
Not 
identified
Total, All 
items
ABS
 aircraft leases 13 9 18 0 0 0 0 40
 automobile loans 72 143 160 0 0 0 43 418
 consumer loans 22 143 16 0 0 0 5 186
 credit card receivables 23 136 14 0 0 0 9 182
 equipment leases 7 97 187 0 0 0 31 322
 future receivables 63 1 0 5 3 0 0 72
 other 142 199 137 26 24 19 45 592
 small business loans 0 346 0 0 0 0 5 351
 whole business loans 149 9 9 4 93 0 0 264
Total 491 1,083 541 35 120 19 138 2,427
# Asset securitization issues categorized by type of originator
 
 
Source: Structured Finance International.
 Table 4: Creditor rights around the world 
 
This table classifies countries by legal origin (see La Porta et al., 2000). We used five creditor rights 
variables in this analysis, and added up the scores to create a creditor right index. This index runs from 0 
(weak protection) to 4 (strong protection). 
 
Variable of interest    
(1)
No automatic stay on 
assets (2)
Secured creditors first 
paid (3)
Restrictions for going into 
reorganizations (4)
Management does not stay in 
reorganization (5)
Creditor rights index 
(6)
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0
Peru 0 0 0 0 0
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0
France 0 0 0 0 0
Argentina 0 1 0 0 1
Brazil 0 0 1 0 1
Greece 0 0 0 1 1
Portugal 0 1 0 0 1
Ireland 0 1 0 0 1
Australia 0 1 0 0 1
U.S. 0 1 0 0 1
Canada 0 1 0 0 1
Finland 0 1 0 0 1
Switzerland 0 1 0 0 1
Turkey 0 1 1 0 2
Uruguay 0 1 0 1 2
Chile 0 1 1 0 2
Spain 1 1 0 0 2
Italy 0 1 1 0 2
Taiwan 1 1 0 0 2
Japan 0 1 0 1 2
Belgium 1 1 0 0 2
Sweden 0 1 1 0 2
Netherlands 0 1 1 0 2
Norway 0 1 1 0 2
Sri Lanka 1 0 1 1 3
Thailand 1 1 0 1 3
South Africa 0 1 1 1 3
South Korea 1 1 0 1 3
Germany 1 1 1 0 3
Austria 1 1 1 0 3
New Zealand 1 0 1 1 3
Denmark 1 1 1 0 3
Pakistan 1 1 1 1 4
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 4
Nigeria 1 1 1 1 4
Egypt 1 1 1 1 4
Zimbabwe 1 1 1 1 4
Kenya 1 1 1 1 4
Ecuador 1 1 1 1 4
India 1 1 1 1 4
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 4
Israel 1 1 1 1 4
Hong Kong 1 1 1 1 4
Singapore 1 1 1 1 4
U.K. 1 1 1 1 4
Jordan na na na na na
Venezuela na 1 na na na
 
 
Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (2000). 
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Table 5: Enforcement around the world 
 
This table classifies countries by legal origin (see La Porta et al., 2000). We used five enforcement 
variables in this analysis, and added up the scores to create an enforcement index. This index runs from 0 
(weak enforcement) to 50 (strong enforcement). 
Variable of interest      
(1)
Efficiency of judicial 
system (2)
Rule of law         
(3)
Corruption             
(4)
Risk of expropriation 
(5)
Risk of contract 
repudiation (6)
Enforcement index      
(7)
Philippines 4.75 2.73 2.92 5.22 4.8 20.42
Pakistan 5 3.03 2.98 5.62 4.87 21.5
Indonesia 2.5 3.98 2.15 7.16 6.09 21.88
Nigeria 7.25 2.73 3.03 5.33 4.36 22.7
Peru 6.75 2.5 4.7 5.54 4.68 24.17
Sri Lanka 7 1.9 5 6.05 5.25 25.2
Egypt 6.5 4.17 3.87 6.3 6.05 26.89
Zimbabwe 7.5 3.68 5.42 5.61 5.04 27.25
Turkey 4 5.18 5.18 7 5.95 27.31
Kenya 5.75 5.42 4.82 5.98 5.66 27.63
Argentina 6 5.35 6.02 5.91 4.91 28.19
Colombia 7.25 2.08 5 6.95 7.02 28.3
Jordan 8.66 4.35 5.48 6.07 4.86 29.42
Thailand 3.25 6.25 5.18 7.42 7.57 29.67
Ecuador 6.25 6.67 5.18 6.57 5.18 29.85
Mexico 6 5.35 4.77 7.29 6.55 29.96
Uruguay 6.5 5 5 6.58 7.29 30.37
India 8 4.17 4.58 7.75 6.11 30.61
Venezuela 6,5 6.37 4.7 6.89 6.3 30.76
Brazil 5.75 6.32 6.32 7.62 6.3 32.31
South Africa 6 4.42 8.92 6.88 7.27 33.49
South Korea 6 5.35 5.3 8.31 8.59 33.55
Chile 7.25 7.02 5.3 7.5 6.8 33.87
Greece 7 6.18 7.27 7.12 6.62 34.19
Malaysia 9 6.78 7.38 7.95 7.43 38.54
Israel 10 4.82 8.33 8.25 7.54 38.94
Portugal 5.5 8.68 7.38 8.9 8.57 39.03
Spain 6.25 7.8 7.38 9.52 8.4 39.35
Italy 6.75 8.33 6.13 9.35 9.17 39.73
Taiwan 6.75 8.52 6.18 9.12 9.16 40.4
Ireland 8.75 7.8 8.52 9.67 8.96 43.7
Hong Kong 10 8.22 8.52 8.29 8.82 43.85
France 8 8.98 9.05 9.65 9.19 44.87
Singapore 10 8.57 8.22 9.3 8.86 44.95
Australia 10 10 8.52 9.27 8.71 46.5
Germany 9 9.23 8.93 9.9 9.77 46.83
Japan 10 8.98 8.52 9.67 9.69 46.87
U.K. 10 8.57 9.1 9.71 9.63 47.01
Austria 9.5 10 8.57 9.69 9.6 47.36
Belgium 9.5 10 8.82 9.63 9.48 47.43
U.S. 10 10 8.63 9.98 9 47.61
Canada 9.25 10 10 9.67 8.96 47.88
Finland 10 10 10 9.67 9.15 48.82
New Zealand 10 10 10 9.69 9.29 48.98
Sweden 10 10 10 9.4 9.58 48.98
Denmark 10 10 10 9.67 9.31 48.98
Netherlands 10 10 10 9.98 9.35 49.33
Norway 10 10 10 9.88 9.71 49.59
Switzerland 10 10 10 9.98 9.98 49.96
 
 
Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (2000). 
 
 
 
 Table 6: Ordinary least squares regression analyses of asset-backed securities 
OLS 1999-01 2002-05 2002-05 Banks
Finance 
houses
Corpo-
rates
Corpo-
rates
Euro-
market
Euro-
market
Other 
markets
Discor-
dance
Variable Reg. #1 Reg. #2 Reg. #3 Reg. #4 Reg. #5 Reg. #6 Reg. #7 Reg. #8 Reg. #9 Reg.#10 Reg. #11 Reg. #12
CONSTANT -29.11 -108.03 125.27 192.09 ** -98.78 305.04 * 291.62 * 287.05 ** 24.12 14.84 -168.08 -44.04
(-0.51) (-1.36) (-0.02) (1.77) (-1.58) (2.79) (2.81) (2.33) (0.44) (0.29) (-1.45) (-0.75)
CR = 3 and 4 28.44 * 32.07 * 21.23 ** 10.79 23.32 * 36.16 * 56.03 * 56.17 * 37.12 * 27.37 * 20.77 29.94 *
(4.88) (3.66) (2.09) (1.11) (3.87) (3.03) (4.48) (3.65) (6.19) (4.59) (0.55) (5.10)
CR = 5 and 6 51.60 * 51.22 * 43.63 * 30.79 * 51.38 * 28.12 * 71.79 * 47.58 * 66.37 * 53.82 * 34.21 * 53.99 *
(8.43) (6.72) (3.48) (3.33) (7.71) (4.30) (7.65) (4.33) (10.89) (7.40) (3.07) (8.42)
CR = 7 and 8 78.75 * 89.67 * 66.60 * 64.78 * 104.03 * 64.37 * 113.02 * 115.62 * 93.32 * 81.83 * 34.48 82.31 *
(5.65) (3.79) (3.79) (4.69) (4.68) (2.01) (5.48) (5.31) (5.63) (5.15) (1.39) (5.64)
CR = 9 and 10 146.25 * 144.09 * 136.65 * 120.20 * 139.18 * 79.03 * 198.98 * 173.81 * 163.94 * 151.57 * 100.75 * 147.94 *
(17.33) (13.86) (8.58) (9.78) (15.76) (4.31) (11.76) (9.69) (19.76) (15.75) (6.46) (17.52)
CR = 11 and 12 367.51 * 368.60 * 370.69 * 322.23 * 347.15 * 355.59 * 520.55 * 505.56 * 389.47 * 378.82 * 303.84 * 369.02 *
(12.53) (10.09) (7.54) (7.61) (9.92) (5.27) (14.61) (13.15) (12.27) (12.03) (3.63) (12.67)
CR = 13 and 14 389.53 * na 381.61 * 386.95 * 386.87 ** na 514.52 * 498.69 * 428.84 * 396.35 * na 393.73 *
(3.58) na (3.30) (3.63) (2.27) na (30.79) (22.04) (4.17) (3.64) na (3.61)
LOAN TO VALUE -24.81 * -20.93 ** -25.44 * -49.92 * -11.99 -15.11 * -2.70 -18.25 -11.54 -18.91 ** -7.46 -25.09 *
(-3.77) (-1.98) (-2.91) (-4.60) (-1.21) (-4.10) (-0.24) (-1.43) (-1.40) (-2.23) (-0.97) (-3.84)
FINANCE HOUSE -17.37 ** 0.75 - excl. - - - - -41.10 * - excl. -17.57 **
(-2.41) (0.07) - excl. - - - - (-4.62) - excl. (-2.42)
BANK -2.93 15.72 *** - -58.15 * - - - - -32.97 * - 1.33 -1.93
(-0.40) (1.89) - (-5.61) - - - - (-4.29) - (0.16) (-0.26)
INSURANCE 112.88 * 72.61 * - 195.83 * - - - - 98.46 * - na 120.36 *
(2.89) (4.04) - (3.53) - - - - (2.34) - na (3.11)
PUBLIC -3.29 -15.33 - 21.61 - - - - 5.38 - na -3.58
(-0.32) (-1.65) - (1.03) - - - - (0.57) - na (-0.35)
SOVEREIGN -29.93 ** -27.68 ** - -20.94 - - - - -25.82 *** - -100.54 -30.52 **
(-2.44) (-2.00) - (-1.32) - - - - (-1.85) - (-1.48) (-2.47)
LOWMATURITY -10.29 -25.57 * 8.98 -3.83 -28.33 * 11.20 -22.21 *** - -3.66 -20.54 -7.33 -9.36
(-1.29) (-3.26) (0.59) (-0.20) (-2.77) (1.30) (-1.95) - (-0.25) (-1.50) (-0.93) (-1.21)
HIGHMATURITY 10.75 ** 11.69 *** 19.63 18.49 ** -1.62 7.67 49.80 * - 16.88 * 12.85 ** na 10.80 **
(2.01) (1.91) (1.49) (2.13) (-0.22) (1.01) (4.30) - (3.51) (2.25) na (2.03)
ENHANCEMENT -22.14 * -27.80 * -12.81 -20.78 ** -15.38 ** -26.01 *** 6.01 -8.83 -15.22 * -21.00 * -89.94 * -22.01 *
(-4.31) (-3.61) (-1.35) (-1.97) (-2.31) (-1.87) (0.57) (-0.73) (-2.72) (-3.79) (-2.74) (-4.27)  
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Table 6: Ordinary least squares regression analyses of asset-backed securities (continued) 
OLS 1999-01 2002-05 2002-05 Banks
Finance 
houses
Corpo-
rates
Corpo-
rates
Euro-
market
Euro-
market
Other 
markets
Discor-
dance
Variable Reg. #1 Reg. #2 Reg. #3 Reg. #4 Reg. #5 Reg. #6 Reg. #7 Reg. #8 Reg. #9 Reg.#10 Reg. #11 Reg. #12
 
CONSUMER 9.70 ** -2.72 24.45 * - 6.91 - - 12.85 - 11.19 ** 8.65 10.21 **
(2.15) (-0.49) (2.65) - (1.29) - - (1.11) - (2.50) (0.55) (2.23)
CREDIT CARD -16.81 ** -19.60 *** -10.69 - -24.55 * - - 13.71 - -12.73 *** -18.57 *** -18.47 **
(-2.29) (-1.94) (-1.10) - (-2.88) - - (0.73) - (-1.95) (-1.83) (-2.54)
FUTURE 42.03 * 60.52 * 33.70 - na - - 25.22 *** - 42.94 * na 41.37 *
(4.34) (5.08) (1.46) - na - - (1.97) - (4.03) na (4.29)
AIRCRAFT LEASE 37.58 * 75.03 * 31.13 - na - - 21.69 - 38.59 * na 39.65 *
(2.71) (4.68) (1.42) - na - - (1.23) - (2.98) na (2.82)
EQUIPMENT LEASE 16.71 * 16.30 * 9.55 - 6.56 - - 13.06 - 11.49 ** -46.00 *** 17.26 *
(3.80) (2.71) (1.36) - (1.08) - - (1.50) - (2.06) (-1.83) (3.88)
OTHER 36.27 * 43.22 * 24.91 ** - 51.46 * - - 40.00 * - 34.53 * -25.37 36.20 *
(6.42) (5.46) (2.14) - (6.36) - - (2.60) - (5.85) (-0.96) (6.37)
SMALL BUSINESS 8.10 -1.40 7.69 - 7.28 - - -13.97 - 8.26 3.60 7.85
(0.85) (-0.14) (0.36) - (0.71) - - (-0.54) - (0.89) (0.09) (0.83)
WHOLE BUSINESS 61.56 * 79.66 * 65.89 * - 18.47 - - 69.38 * - 65.43 * -17.64 60.03 *
(5.21) (6.91) (3.57) - (0.25) - - (5.43) - (7.18) (-0.67) (5.06)
PERIOD II -8.23 *** - - - -7.31 -10.05 ** -5.75 -10.60 -9.42 ** -7.12 -0.75 -7.35 ***
(-1.94) - - - (-1.39) (-2.17) (-0.53) (-0.88) (-2.08) (-1.50) (-0.11) (-1.76)
LOAN SIZE 8.00 3.85 8.02 0.43 5.27 - - - 14.97 * 7.50 3.15 7.35
(1.54) (0.57) (0.75) (0.06) (0.88) - - - (2.84) (1.18) (0.35) (1.42)
TRANSACTION SIZE -7.25 5.33 -22.76 -37.35 ** -1.03 -21.41 ** -34.32 ** -35.67 ** -14.26 -11.87 26.47 ** -5.77
(-0.77) (0.47) (-1.39) (-2.45) (-0.10) (-2.46) (-2.48) (-2.11) (-1.45) (-1.13) (2.00) (-0.62)
# TRANCHES -0.35 0.09 -0.84 - 0.29 -0.47 - - -0.08 -0.96 - -0.36
(-0.66) (0.06) (-1.23) - (0.24) (-1.44) - - (-0.11) (-1.28) - (-0.67)
EUROMARKET 14.10 * 7.10 6.62 * 56.85 * 14.51 -7.37 ** 19.88 ** 32.92 ** - - - 13.93 *
(2.77) (0.70) (3.62) (5.02) (1.57) (-2.28) (2.03) (2.27) - - - (2.77)
# LEAD MANAGERS -7.79 ** -8.89 ** -4.44 -5.37 -4.33 - - - -9.38 * -9.81 * - -8.17 **
(-2.23) (-2.57) (-0.63) (-0.82) (-1.28) - - - (-2.86) (-2.71) - (-2.38)
# RATING AGENCIES -0.72 -0.43 3.32 -1.42 -2.46 - 0.83 -0.50 -1.08 -0.15 - 0.90
(-0.18) (-0.09) (0.50) (-0.27) (-0.50) - (0.08) (-0.05) (-0.25) (-0.03) - (0.23)
TAP 0.86 3.28 11.62 -11.10 5.45 na 2.42 -1.37 3.84 0.50 na 1.14
(0.10) (0.39) (0.62) (-0.51) (0.65) na (0.20) (-0.11) (0.42) (0.06) na (0.13)  
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 Table 6: Ordinary least squares regression analyses of asset-backed securities (continued) 
OLS 1999-01 2002-05 2002-05 Banks
Finance 
houses
Corpo-
rates
Corpo-
rates
Euro-
market
Euro-
market
Other 
markets
Discor-
dance
Variable Reg. #1 Reg. #2 Reg. #3 Reg. #4 Reg. #5 Reg. #6 Reg. #7 Reg. #8 Reg. #9 Reg.#10 Reg. #11 Reg. #12
 
23.96 21.53 * 31.66 * 18.34 ** 5.39 1.07 * 42.18 * 26.50 * 24.25 * ** 22.12 *FIXED -5.00 -57.66
(4.48) (3.97) (2.17) (0.62) (0.12) (-0.02) (2.77) (4.37) (3.98) (3.90) (-2.28) (4.52)
11.18 42.93 ** 80.98 * 23.71 107.53 ** 9.63RETAINED -19.12 na na na na na
(0.78) (-0.66) (2.05) (3.54) (1.27) (2.46) na na na na na (0.67)
EMERGING 75.18 ** 105.58 *** 88.35 *** 54.97 50.45 113.33 73.95 ** 76.04 * 86.62 *** 67.83 55.91 73.06 **
(2.18) (1.91) (1.89) (1.57) (0.82) (1.24) (2.46) (2.63) (1.74) (1.38) (1.46) (2.10)
CREDITOR RIGHTS 1.40 -2.45 - 4.61 -0.71 -1.60 - - - - - 1.84
(0.52) (-0.63) - (1.11) (-0.18) (-0.53) - - - - - (0.71)
ENFORCEMENT 1.19 1.19 2.81 3.92 ** 2.20 *** -1.78 - - 1.22 1.46 - 1.19
(1.19) (1.08) (1.17) (2.00) (1.83) (-1.51) - - (1.47) (1.51) - (1.20)
CURRENCY RISK 9.49 25.46 * -13.86 -40.91 12.24 20.30 7.96 17.19 *** -5.17 16.52 *** -67.00 10.72
(1.00) (2.75) (-0.42) (-1.56) (0.81) (1.61) (1.02) (1.79) (-0.56) (1.80) (-1.61) (1.13)
DISCO - - - - - - - - - - - -11.06 ***
(-1.79)
Number of observations 968 549 413 333 604 183 199 202 813 831 94 968
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.71 0.83 0.88 0.87 0.75 0.76 0.85 0.76
Adjusted R2c 0.61 0.69 0.54 0.51 0.63 0.64 0.76 0.76 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.61
F R2 84.71 56.25 42.11 40.93 49.85 47.05 79.22 54.82 92.19 90.15 24.76 82.87
F R2c 296.88 288.41 83.27 34.00 215.02 89.70 127.44 127.44 188.92 188.92 49.61 296.88
 
The dependent variable is defined as the margin yielded by the security at issue above a corresponding benchmark. The dependent variable is measured in basis points. The 
independent variables are as follows: CR (credit rating), set of rating dummy variables that correspond to credit rating 1-2 (CR=1-2), 3-4 (CR=3-4), 5-6 (CR=5-6), 7-8 (CR=7-8), 9-10 (CR=9-
10), 11-12 (CR=11-12), and 13-14 (CR=13-14); LOAN TO VALUE is the subordination level expressed as a percentage of the transaction’s initial principal balance; set of originator dummy 
variables:  FINANCE HOUSE are finance house loans; BANK are bank loans; INSURANCE include those loans made by financial institutions that primarily sell insurance; PUBLIC are those 
loans originated by any state or local government; SOVEREIGN are sovereign loans; LOWMATURITY is 1 if the issue matures in les than 5 years; HIGHMATURITY is 1 if loan matures 
after 15 years; ENHANCEMENT dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the issue has a third-party guarantee in the form of an insurance policy issued by one of the monoline insurance 
companies; set of collateral dummy variables: CONSUMER are consumer loans; CREDIT CARD are credit card loans; FUTURE are future receivables; AIRCRAFT LEASE are leases-
aircraft; EQUIPMENT LEASE are leases-equipment; SMALL BUSINESS are small-business loans; WHOLE BUSINESS are whole-business loans; OTHER are other loans; PERIOD II 
dummy variable of 1 that corresponds to the loan issued in the 2002-2005 period, zero if the loan was issued in the period 1999-2001; LOAN SIZE is the natural log of the issue amount in 
millions of Euros; TRANSACTION SIZE is the natural log of the size of the transaction in Euro millions; # TRANCHES is the number of tranches per transaction; EUROMARKET has a 
dummy of 1 if the loan issued is placed on the euromarket, zero if the loan is placed on other markets; # LEAD MANAGERS is the number of managers representing the number of financial 
institutions participating in the loan issuance management group; # RATING AGENCIES is the number of rating agencies involved in rating the loan at the time of issuance; TAP dummy 
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variable of 1 if the issue corresponds to a tap issue; FIXED has a dummy of 1 if the loan issue has a rate which is fixed for the life of the loan, zero if the loan has an interest rate that fluctuates 
depending on the base interest rate (floating rate issue); RETAINED is the retained subordinated interest as a beneficial interest in a securitization transaction by the originator; EMERGING 
has a dummy of 1 if the issue is originated in an emerging country, zero otherwise; CREDITOR RIGHTS and ENFORCEMENT measure the legal strength of the issue by country of origin; 
ENFORCEMENT measures the strength of a country's legal system; CURRENCY RISK dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if currency risk occurs. The table shows the coefficient and t-
statistic, corrected for heteroscedasticity, in parentheses. * and ** and *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Source: Structured Finance International; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (2000). 
 
 Table 7: Adjusted R2 for different specifications of Regression #1 
 
 
Independent variables adjusted R2 F-test
all characteristics 0.76 84.71
default and recovery risk characteristics 0.70 109.67
marketability characteristics 0.13 20.41
systemic characteristics 0.07 22.88
default and recovery risk + marketability characteristics 0.77 106.51
default and recovery risk + systemic characteristics 0.69 82.14
marketability characteristics + systemic characteristics 0.19 20.88
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Figure 1 
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Plot of OLS regression coefficients of spread on rating dummy variables to rating values. Rating values are 
the numeric values of ratings given by Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s as defined in Table 2. 
Includes 812 and 564 observations for the sub-sample 1999-2002 and 2003-2005, respectively. 
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Figure 2 
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Plot of OLS regression coefficients of spread on rating dummy variables to rating values. Rating values are 
the numeric values of ratings given by Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s as defined in Table 2. 
Includes 800, 312, and 264 observations for the sub-sample of banks, corporates and finance companies, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
